How to Get an Internet "Terrorist" To Plant a Bomb (If You're the FBI)

Last Friday, the U.S. Joint Terrorism Task Force announced the arrest of Adel Daoud, a suburban Chicago teenager who’s since been said to be “enamored with Osama bin Laden and intent on killing Americans.” Daoud is charged with planting a bomb outside a downtown bar and attempting to detonate it. He failed.

The bomb was a dummy, provided by the FBI—specifically an agent posing as his co-conspirator. Accused in similar past operations of entrapping hapless “jihadists,” the feds worked hard to keep the Daoud sting above board. And while it’s great to see authorities actively pursuing potential terrorists online, a 35-page FBI affidavit shows the agency’s efforts in the Daoud case hew closer to the letter of the law than the spirit of preventing terrorism. Here’s a seven-step guide to how the FBI ended up arresting Daoud for a bomb the agency gave him.

Daoud began his international campaign to incite “violent jihad” in October 2011. This involved frequenting known terrorist hangouts online, emailing pubertal missives to his buddies and Al Qaeda pinups to himself, and turning a New York Times bestseller into a PowerPoint book report. (All following excerpts are from the FBI affidavit.)

In or about December 2011, Daoud, using Daoud Account 1, emailed several individuals a lengthy powerpoint presentation titled "The Osama Bin Laden I Know," which Daoud purportedly prepared for school. The presentation is a "book review" of Peter Bergen’s book (of the same title) and defends Bin Laden's tactics. For example, Daoud writes, "Osama wasn't crazy for wanting to destroy America. This superpower killed millions of people."

On or about March 14, 2012, Daoud, using Daoud Account 1, sent an email to Individual A, defending Anwar Al-Awlaki: "those people insulting awlaki can go kill themselves mashaAllah he is very knowledgable w. a decent character. inshaAllah hes accepted as a shaheed. people r quick to judge n insult including muslims. the truth is he was against america n becuz america is the superpower he is always going to be seen as wrong no matter wat he says or does."

He was an angry young man, sure, but if a high school kid ranting on the Internet is a top homeland security threat then surely the war on terror’s been licked, right? I mean, if that’s enough to spark an FBI sting, then all the denizens of 4Chan need watch out. But the eleven months between his first appearance on the radar and last week’s arrest also accommodated a matter more mundane: At some point in the year, Daoud presumably turned 18.

For whatever reason, the FBI’s jihad-web lurkers decided Adel Daoud was a grave danger. But, oddly, his desire to pursue religious violence was already—if precariously—being held in check: not by law enforcement, but by the religious community around him.

On or about May 17, 2012, an FBI online undercover employee ("OCE1") reached out to Daoud by sending a message to another account Daoud used to exchange electronic communications ("Daoud Account 2"). OCE1's message complimented Daoud on the material he had posted online, which was associated with Daoud Account 2….In summary, OCE1 purported to be a Saudi Arabia-based person who had been invited to and was deciding whether to engage in violent jihad in Yemen or Syria. OCE1 and Daoud exchanged several communications relating to violent jihad and Daoud's intentions to engage in violent jihad. For example:
>>On or about May 29, 2012, Daoud wrote that "even my sheikh in my masjid was talking to me about NOT talking about jihad." Daoud continued: "sometimes [my sheikh] even mentions verses of jihad (from the Quran) and i almost think he going to call for it then he has something general like be a good example or something. lol man I will be the opposite."

Is violent jihad a normal thing to do? Daoud’s sheikh said no. His new Saudi Arabian FBI agent friend implied yes. Was there anything to tip the balance? Actually, there was three days earlier, but it was oddly named later in the affidavit:

Another FBI undercover employee ("OCE2") sent a message to Daoud Account 1 on or about May 14, 2012, in response to a video Daoud had posted online, which listed the Daoud Account 1 as a point of contact. That same day, Daoud responded….In summary, OCE2 purported to be a 17 year-old, Australia-based person with a recently-developed interest in violent jihad.

Thus contacted by like-minded youngsters FBI agents purporting to be from opposite ends of the earth, Daoud reoriented his jihad ambitions around the dilemma of thinking globally vs. acting locally. On May 31, he posted to a web forum:

I live in the United States of America/hypocrisy. I want to in the future insha'Allah go for jihad in the Cause of Allah but I wasn't sure where to go. I wanted to go to Yemen because of the hadith quoted by anwar al awlaki where the prophet (may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him) says that there will be 12,000 that were appear in Abyan [a region in Yemen] and they will be the best between me and them….The point is in this magazine they encourage Muslims in the West especially in the USA to attack IN America. By all means this is something i would consider. But in know that if i started attacking in America i would probably not be able to go to Yemen or anywhere else for Jihad in the Cause of Allah….Is there a way i could do both, or what’s your opinion on that?

Daoud ruminated on the question with more posts and enterprising internet research:

Between on or about May 29, and on or about June 15, 2012…individual using a computer within Daoud's residence performed a number of internet searches on the
same topics, such as:
* "is suicide bombing halal"
* "44 ways to support jihad"18
* "kill the infidels sheikh anwar al awlaki"
* "is it halal to blow up a train"
* "are attacking planes and trains halal"
* "killing americans in islam"
* "what percentage of americans support the military"

By July, Daoud decided striking in the U.S. was justified, and his new friend was ready to help him operationalize the threat.

During OCE2's communications with Daoud, mentioned above in ¶13, OCE2 told Daoud that OCE2 had a purported cousin, who, in essence, wanted OCE2 to join the cousin in committing terrorist acts. On or about July 10, 2012, OCE2 sent a message to Daoud Account 2, stating that OCE2's cousin was interested in meeting Daoud. OCE2 explained that OCE2's cousin is "half Afghan" and that he "has some action history."

Daoud’s interest was naturally piqued by a real-life Afghan terrorist—one who sent him a text message on July 15 asking to meet.

The UCE [undercover FBI agent] met with Daoud on July 17, 2012, at around 6:30 p.m. The meeting took place at Prairie Path Park in Villa Park, Illinois, and lasted a little over two hours. During the meeting, which the UCE audio recorded, Daoud and the UCE discussed a number of topics, including the UCE’s purported experiences fighting with "mujahideen brothers" in Afghanistan, Inspire magazine, Al-Qaeda and its allegiances, and the need for Muslims to engage in "jihad." ….The UCE said that he and his brothers were interested in attacking a major city, including perhaps Chicago. In response, Daoud said that he wanted to go overseas for violent jihad, but that he wanted to "do something [an attack] here [in the United States] at the same time." After Daoud discussed some ideas for a terrorist attack, the UCE asked Daoud to write down his ideas, which he could provide to the UCE at a subsequent meeting.

I won’t say that he was star-struck with a mujahideen teen idol, but in any case Daoud dutifully brought four handwritten pages of terrorist ideas to their next meeting on August 6. He professed grown-up interest in the “technical” aspects of mass murder, but it appears “UCE” was always understood as the partner who’d take care of the hard part — making a bomb. Like most 18 year olds in most situations, Daoud preoccupied himself with questions of size and reputation:

“[T]hey have to know it's a terrorist attack. Because if the people just say oh, how like, like the thing that just happened, the, the, the Joker thing okay . . . Oh, the person was crazy. Oh, that’s so sad . . . That's it, okay, they forget about it after a week . . . You know what I mean? And, and if he could get away that's good.
Because they'll think oh, terrorism . . . it'll be like frantic.”

During their conversation, Daoud and the UCE discussed the list of potential targets that Daoud prepared, including the following:
>>a. Daoud told the UCE that he had tried to look for the biggest mall and that is why he selected a certain large suburban mall for the list.
>>b. With respect to selecting a bar or nightclub as a target, Daoud said, "if we target a bar, like a populated bar, I think it's usually at night so that actually makes it easier because of the darkness." Daoud added.that such an attack "won't kill any Muslims for sure . . . [a]nd if you do it's their fault."

Daoud decided a concert would deliver maximum carnage and recruited a friend to help him case locations. Believing UCE to be a promising middle manager from the Al Qaeda home office—whose capture could jeopardize global jihad—Daoud mans up to assuming the major part of the danger:

[On August 14] The UCE asked "how did the homework go with your sahaba," Daoud said "he found it very hard." According to Daoud, "he [Individual C] found a place but it had cameras and they didn't let bags in." Daoud said that he was "going to search for concerts" in an effort to "find a better one." The UCE wrote that they perhaps "shouldn't do the bag thing" because "it is too risky." Alternatively, if they decide to deliver explosives in a bag, the UCE insisted that he (the UCE) "should carry the bag" so that he "take[s] the risk." Daoud responded: "dude no way . . . if we took something inside we wudn't let you take the risk." Daoud said that if they "got in trouble," Daoud and Individual C should "get [the UCE] out of it," meaning they would "take full responsibility," because Daoud would not damage the cause to save myself some trouble."

The friend, Individual C, proves a slightly cannier criminal mastermind. Daoud voices C’s concern to UCE, resulting in a replay of the single most tragicomic scene in all of Breaking Bad: "Daoud said Individual C believed the UCE was ‘a spy.’ Daoud told the UCE that he would ‘kill’ a person who is a spy and that he doesn't ‘take this . . . lightly.’ The UCE agreed, remarking that ‘anybody who spies must be killed.’"

Earlier, in a August 11 exchange, UCE had told Daoud that his sheikh — i.e., the undercover agent’s commanding officer in faux-Qaeda — proscribed them from carrying out the Chicago attack during Ramadan. Daoud protested, in the manner of a toddler saying “Not fair!” But he accepted the verdict. UCE then again conjured the unseen sheikh/terrorist luminary for a “Are you man enough?” gut-check:

The UCE conveyed to Daoud that, apart from the timing of the attack, the UCE’s sheikh was also concerned about Daoud’s commitment to the operation. The UCE wrote: "My sheikh also wanted to make sure this is something that is in your heart. Jihad is not something that others can for on you or put pressure on you. He wants to make sure you have no doubt in your heart. Daoud responded, "you can tell him how i reacted when you said we cannot do it in Ramadan . . . that is sufficient proof that this in my heart."

Daoud met with UCE again on August 23. He named his selected target, a nightclub. ("It's a bar, it's a liquor store, it's a concert. All in one bundle….the evilest people…all the kuffars are there.") This selection, his major contribution to the “plan,” was chosen through Google Street View.

But Daoud wasn’t entirely fired up and ready to go. A few days earlier, he was overheard discussing jihad in his mosque. First his sheikh, then his father, then another sheikh “yelled at” Daoud for thinking violence the answer. (It doesn’t appear any of the men ever believed there was an actual plan or target in place.) Individual 3 was also dissuaded, and backed out of the plan for good. But Daoud — clearly, an 18 year old with an 8 year old’s faith in male authority figures — imagined two sheikhs’ judgments could be overturned with the word of a third, more famous sheikh. He asked UCE to ask his commander for some sort of sanctioning fatwa.

With days to prepare, the FBI delivered a true masterstroke on August 23. Though his phantom sheikh, UCE could reissue the chest-poke of August 11 — Are you man enough, Muslim enough, to truly want this? — while simultaneously committing to the record Daoud’s repeated insistence that he was acting independently.

The UCE brought up the topic of Daoud's request for guidance from the UCE's sheikh and explained that he could not provide such guidance because his sheikh was concerned about pressuring Daoud into carrying out an attack: UCE: . . . And he [the UCE's sheikh], he wants to make sure that he, the sheikh is not pressuring you, that I'm not pressuring you. 'Cuz you know in Islam you can't force anybody.
Daoud: Right.
UCE: This has to be in your heart, especially jihad. You know it's in your heart. It's something you believe in. It's something you either believe in or you don't.
Daoud: Right.
The UCE: Right. And my sheikh wanted to make, wanted to make sure that you were not pressured by anybody.
Daoud: Tell him that . . . I'm convinced.
. . .
Daoud: So I mean I'm, I'm totally fine with this. You tell him that the first time we wanted to do something [during Ramadan], you know how upset I was.
. . .
The UCE: . . . So that's why since that happened he wants to make sure this is something you believe in, number one, that you're not doing it for somebody else.
Daoud: No.
The UCE: That I'm not pressuring you.
Daoud: Who can, who else can I do it for? If everyone else is brainwashed, just me and some other brothers, I'm the top of the brainwashing crew. You know what I mean?

“The arrest of ADEL DAOUD, 18, a US citizen, was the culmination of a rigorous undercover operation,” assured the US Attorney’s Office, “during which Daoud developed his attack plans and surveilled and selected a target. Daoud was closely monitored by law enforcement and was offered several opportunities to change his mind and walk away from the supposed attack.”

The authorities may not have gotten any closer to nabbing a real terror cell, with real capabilities and real existence independent of police action. But like a Kafkaesque spinoff of To Catch a Predator, Adel Daoud, for one, has learned the warning signs of a terrorist scam. Whether all those fathers and shiekhs at his mosque had their faith in non-violence — or the benign nature of American intentions — vindicated remains to be seen.