Ten Years Ago, North Korea Went Nuclear

The first direct evidence came in the form of an earthquake. The United States Geological Survey reported a 4.2 magnitude tremor in North Hamgyong Province, the northernmost North Korean territory and one of four provinces spanning the Chinese border. Three days later, on Oct. 11, air samples collected by US aircraft confirmed that a nuclear explosion had indeed taken place. And, with that, the repressive and volatile kingdom of North Korea became the eighth nuclear power, and one of several so-called "undeclared" nuclear states, including India, Pakistan, and Israel.

It was a shitty nuclear explosion, as far as nuclear explosions go. It wasn't even clear at first that that's what had happened. It seemed like maybe a dud or a fizzle, according to early reports. The total yield was later estimated to be about a half-kiloton, or less than 10 percent of the yield of the "Little Boy" bomb dropped over Hiroshima. Early on, both China and Russia suggested much higher yields, closer to 10 or 15 kilotons—estimates that may have originated with North Korea itself.

By 2006, North Korea had been working on a nuclear program for nearly half a century. In the years following the Korean War, Kim Il-sung, the North Korean leader from 1948 through 1994, went full Stalin, consolidating hard-line rule and purging rivals. In 1962, he began a program of hyper-militarization. It featured the slogan, "Arms on the one hand, and hammer and sickle on the other." Its policy was fourfold: arm the entire populace, fortify the entire country, train soldiers to be party loyalists, and, finally, to modernize military weapons and equipment. (See:The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History.)

North Korea, from then on, would be in a state of almost-war—relentless anticipation. On the nuclear front, the DPRK established a research center at Yongbyon, facility located about 90 km north of Pyongyang, staffed with students who had trained in the Soviet Union and featuring a Soviet IRT-2M research reactor. From 1965 through 1973, the Soviets would provide it with a steady supply of enriched fuel. North Korea would soon enough add a second research reactor to its program and upgrade the first to allow fuel enriched to 80 percent. In the 1980s, the DPRK would turn its gaze to actual nuclear weapons. A new, secret nuclear reactor was added to the Yongbyon facility.

If this seems like a long timeline compared to, say, the Manhattan Project, it may be that North Korea has been operating with a slightly different motivation. Rather than the weapon, It's the process itself—the existence of a nuclear program in some form—that the DPRK wielded so successfully through the decades as sort of a bargaining chip. Acting crazy and dangerous is a great way to get attention. In the early-90s, for example, North Korea began refusing IAEA access to two nuclear waste disposal sites and threatened to ditch the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It would bring the US to the table in direct talks with the DPRK regime.

With nuclear weapons, the fact that the threat may be deferred to some point in the future is a lot less relevant. The net increase in destructive potential is just that great. It's like a singularity of military power.

Or it was, anyhow. The 2006 test brought new sanctions to North Korea courtesy of the United Nations Security Council. The sanctions, approved by a unanimous vote, banned most military imports and exports, forbade future nuclear weapons tests, and banned imports of luxury goods. North Korea called the new sanctions a "declaration of war." Then, in 2007, in exchange for allowing UN weapons inspectors into the country and a promise to disable its nuclear facilities, the United States and four other nations provided the DPRK with $400 million in fuel oil in aid. This is the pattern.

North Korea has since tested five nuclear weapons in total, and new reports this week suggest that it's preparing for a sixth.